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Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal
Theodore Eisenberg and Michael Heise
ABSTRACT
Prior federal civil appellate studies show that appeals courts overturn jury verdicts more than
bench decisions and that defendants fare better than plaintiffs on appeal. Attitudinal and
selection effect hypotheses may explain the appellate court tilt favoring defendants. This
study presents the first statistical models of the appeals process for a comprehensive set of
state court civil trials to test theories on appellate outcomes. Using data from 46 large counties
on 8,038 trials and 549 concluded appeals, we find that appellate reversal rates for jury trials
and defendant appeals exceed reversal rates for bench trials and plaintiff appeals. The reversal
rate for plaintiff appeals is 21.5 percent, compared with 41.5 percent for defendant appeals.
The reversal rate for jury trials is 33.7 percent, compared with 27.5 percent for bench trials.
Descriptive analyses and more formal models suggest that appellate judges’ attitudes toward
trial-level adjudicators help explain these asymmetric outcomes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Appealed cases form the core of what most observers know about the
legal system. Appellate opinions dominate casebooks, establish doctrine
that binds trial courts, and are more readily available for research use
than are the mass of unappealed cases. Yet perceptions of the legal system
based on appellate or published opinions can be distorted. For example,
Siegelman and Donohue (1990) showed that federal court employment
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discrimination case opinions constitute only the tip of a large underlying
iceberg of adjudicated discrimination cases.
Although we know a reasonable amount about these distortions that
are introduced by observing opinions in federal court, the rates of appeal,
and the influences on the decision to appeal in federal court (Clermont
and Eisenberg 2001; Eisenberg 2004), similar knowledge about these
matters in state courts does not exist. Yet, as Galanter (2004) notes, the
bulk of civil litigation—including appellate litigation—occurs in state
courts. This article uses a unique data set (U.S. Department of Justice
2006) that followed a comprehensive cohort of tried state court cases
through their conclusion at the appellate level. Using these data, we
present the first broad systematic empirical study of state court appeal
rates and outcomes not subject to traditional concerns about opinion
availability and lack of information about all trial outcomes.
Data limitations have not dampened the formation of either opinions
or conventional wisdom concerning the appeals system. Indeed, the ab-
sence of data enhances the influence of opinions, anecdotes, and casual
impressions. For example, in the appeals context, advice to lawyers typ-
ically emphasizes the sanctity of jury verdicts and warns that “appellate
challenges to jury findings rarely succeed” (Somerville 1992, p. 25). Not
surprisingly, such advice informs concrete decisions at the beginning of
the litigation process when a lawyer’s decision about whether to select
a jury trial pivots partly on popular perceptions about the comparative
resilience of jury outcomes to appellate review (see Haydock and Son-
steng 1990, p. 81).
Holding conventional wisdoms and perceptions up to empirical light
frequently uncovers surprises (see, for example, Clermont and Eisenberg
1992). One set of surprises about civil appeals emerged from studies of
federal courts drawing on data from the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (AO) (Eisenberg 2004; Clermont and Eisenberg 2002b).
Contrary to received wisdom, for example, these studies found that jury
verdicts were more prone to reversal than were bench verdicts (Clermont
and Eisenberg 2001). In addition, defendants’ success with appeals sys-
tematically and substantially exceeded plaintiffs’ success, and both suc-
cess rates were on average far below 50 percent (Clermont and Eisenberg
2002b), despite informed speculation that appellate success rates should
be near 50 percent (Priest and Klein 1984). Moreover, Clermont, Eisen-
berg, and Schwab (2003) found these general findings presented with
even greater force within specific case types.
Systematic research on state civil appeals of trials can accomplish
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several goals. Such research helps test litigation theories generated by
law and economics and other scholars. Testing theories using state ap-
peals is warranted in its own right because appeals provide the bulk of
our knowledge of the legal system and “the great preponderance of trials,
both civil and criminal, take place in the state courts” (Galanter 2004,
p. 506). Comparison with federal appellate research provides an op-
portunity to assess the consistency of state and federal court patterns as
well as the robustness of findings from prior work on federal appeals.
This study of state appeals benefits from data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) and the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), which,
unlike the AO data set used in federal appeals studies, are designed
expressly for systematic study of the appeals process.1 By following a
cohort of trials to conclusion, these state court data avoid the problems
of ex post efforts to match trial outcomes and appeals (see, for example,
Eisenberg 2004; Clermont and Eisenberg 2002b) and permit unprece-
dented analyses of state court appeals. Although helpful descriptive work
using the state appeals data set sketches the broad contours of the state
appeals terrain (U.S. Department of Justice 2005), our study is the first
systematic empirical analysis of state appellate activity that models crit-
ical aspects of the state civil appeals process and empirically tests the
competing hypotheses on appellate outcomes.
Key findings in this study are that, similar to civil trials in state courts,
appeals are comparatively rare events. In our data set of 8,038 completed
state court trials, only 12 percent stimulated an appeal. Of the 965 trials
that continued to the appeal process, 549, or just over one-half, cul-
minated in a final appellate court decision. Finally, rarer still are cases
that exhausted a state’s full appellate process, from the trial court to
the highest appellate tribunal. Of the 965 cases that initiated appeals,
only 24 cases reached a state’s appellate court of last resort.2 For all
practical purposes, trial court decisions effectively terminate the bulk of
the legal disputes they address.
We also find that the state appellate court results are asymmetric in
two noteworthy ways. First, although state appellate courts affirmed
trial court decisions in more than two-thirds of all cases, appellate courts
were more likely to upset jury trials than bench trials. Second, defendants
were far more successful than plaintiffs in securing a reversal of a trial
1. Appeals studies using Administrative Office data, while important, must work with
data sets not expressly designed for appeals studies.
2. The 24 cases that reached a state’s appellate court of last resort represent 2.5 percent
of the cases appealed and .3 percent of cases litigated through trial.
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court outcome. A plaintiff victory in front of a jury was the most likely
scenario to generate an appellate court reversal. Our results also suggest
that appellate court attitudes and assumptions about trial courts likely
shape the observed pattern of appeals’ outcomes even after accounting
for the selection of cases to appeal. This study’s findings largely comport
with previous findings from studies of federal appeals and support ex-
planations that include the attitudinal hypothesis as well as selection
effect considerations.
Section 2 briefly describes the two major theories that compete to
explain the asymmetrical appellate outcomes. Section 3 describes the
data, methodology, and research design. Section 4 presents descriptive
results with a particular emphasis on the contours of the stream of cases
from trial verdict through the appeals processes. Section 5 reports re-
gression results that confirm and refine the core results in Section 4.
Section 6 concludes.
2. COMPETING THEORIES ON ASYMMETRICAL APPELLATE OUTCOMES
As we illustrate below, state court appellate outcomes systematically
favor defendants, especially defendants who lost jury trials. Our results
generally comport with similar asymmetrical findings in federal appellate
courts (Clermont and Eisenberg 2002b). Theory supplies two hypotheses
that compete to explain our central finding of an appellate court tilt
favoring defendants—the attitudinal and selection effect hypotheses.
2.1. Differential Attitude Hypothesis
The differential attitude hypothesis (hereinafter, the “attitudinal hy-
pothesis”)3 emphasizes the possibility that either trial courts exhibit a
pro-plaintiff bias or appeals courts perceive (or misperceive) trial courts
as being pro-plaintiff. Notable anecdotal evidence of different trial court
and appellate perspectives, and of appellate suspicion about trial court
behavior, comes from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper In-
dustries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (532 U.S. 424 [2001]).
That case requires appellate courts to “apply a de novo standard of
review when passing on district courts’ determinations of the constitu-
3. We use the term “attitudinal” with some caution in this context. Although the term
has a specific meaning in the literature on judicial decision making (see, generally, Segal
and Spaeth 2002), we use the term here to refer not to judicial background or belief variables
but rather to group-level attitudinal differences between appellate and trial court judges.
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tionality of punitive damages awards” (532 U.S. 424, 436). Such non-
deferential review of trial court decisions about an issue often involving
the size of awards would be unnecessary absent a belief that appellate
and trial courts have differing attitudes. Decisional bias is implied by
differences in trial and appeals court outcomes as well as the starkly
asymmetrical distribution of appeals outcomes between plaintiffs and
defendants. This hypothesis assumes that bias can influence appellate
(and trial) outcomes, and this assumption enjoys empirical support
(LoPucki and Weyrauch 2000).
What might plausibly account for an appellate court bias against
plaintiffs, and what are we to make of it? First, trial court bias favoring
plaintiffs may exist. One source of potential bias flows from natural
empathy with a victim, an impulse to make victims whole, and a will-
ingness to redistribute wealth from a comparatively deeper economic
pocket to an aggrieved plaintiff. Unlike appellate courts, trial courts do
not deal with a “cold” record and are less concerned with opinion writ-
ing and the future effect of their decisions (Tigar 1993).
Second, even if trial court bias does not exist, appellate courts may
assume that such a bias exists and act accordingly. Indeed, persistent
public characterizations of a liability crisis may help frame appellate
courts’ perceptions of trial court decisions. Prior research emphasizes
that persistent misperceptions of a liability crisis can pervade not only
the populace but the legal profession as well (Galanter 2006; Clermont
and Eisenberg 1992). Many envision an “out of control” civil justice
system (Galanter 2006, p. 21). In such a context, why should we assume
that appellate judges are immune (Robertson 1999)? Regardless of
whether appellate courts accurately or inaccurately assume that trial
courts favor plaintiffs, appellate courts may tilt in defendants’ favor to
offset a perceived trial court bias favoring plaintiffs. Thus, for either
reason (or both), one might expect trial courts to favor plaintiffs relative
to appellate courts.
2.2. Selection Effect Hypothesis
A second plausible hypothesis is case-selection based and posits that
plaintiffs and defendants systematically appeal cases of different quality
and that these different case streams explain asymmetric appellate re-
versal rates. Systematically different cases might flow from three possible
sources: differential stakes, settlement incentives, and differences be-
tween defendants and plaintiffs. Generating specific quantitative predic-
tions based on selection effect considerations can be difficult (Shavell
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1996), but ignoring such considerations would be naive (Clermont and
Eisenberg 2002a).
Plaintiffs and defendants might possess different stakes in a lawsuit,
and, if so, selection theory implies that the side with comparatively more
at stake should be willing to settle its weakest cases and, in so doing,
increase its win rate for those cases fully adjudicated (Clermont and
Eisenberg 2001). The plaintiff win rate at trial was approximately 55.4
percent (U.S. Department of Justice 2004), and it remains possible that
the slightly higher plaintiff trial win rate might evidence plaintiffs’ higher
stakes (Clermont and Eisenberg 2001). Just as plaintiffs’ higher stakes
in cases should boost their trial win rates, the selection hypothesis also
predicts that the side with lower stakes (defendants), having lost more
at trial, would appeal more. More important, however, is that plaintiffs,
whose hypothesized higher case stakes should make them more selective
about what cases to push at trial, should be equally careful about only
pushing strong cases on appeal. If so, appeal reversal rates for plaintiffs
would approximate, if not exceed, the defendants’ reversal rates.
Differences in plaintiff and defendant settlement incentives would
help explain differences in plaintiff and defendant reversal rates on ap-
peal. Even assuming that plaintiff-appellees and defendant-appellants
have different incentives when it comes to settlement strategy, to cohere,
the settlement explanation must also assume that defendants who lost
at trial would settle their weakest appeals and that defendants who were
victorious at trial would stonewall appealing plaintiffs on appeal. Such
strategic defendant conduct, however, strikes us as implausible so long
as one assumes that some defendants who lost at trial with objectively
weak cases are nonetheless still motivated to file an appeal in the hope
of a long-shot victory and with the certainty of prolonging the appellate
process if only to delay the legal day of reckoning (Dalton 1985; Hyman
et al. 2007). After all, defendants who pressed objectively weak cases
to trial may not suddenly change attitudes and tactics posttrial.
Selection effect theorists might posit further differences that distin-
guish plaintiffs and defendants that could account for asymmetrical ap-
pellate reversal rates. For example, where losing defendants might assess
settlement decisions through a cost-benefit lens, Posner (1985) notes that
losing plaintiffs, by contrast, might place more weight on the desire to
“be heard fully” on appeal, perhaps regardless of their objective chances
on appeal (Barclay 1999, pp. 12–14). If so, one would expect an ap-
pellate rate to favor defendants, as they would be pursuing objectively
stronger appeals.
S TAT E C O U R T T R I A L S O N A P P E A L / 127
Prior work on selection theory and federal appellate outcomes in-
cludes an innovative effort by Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996, pp.
237, 242–48) linking asymmetric stakes, costs, and information and
other factors (what they termed a “multimodal approach”) to specific
case categories to test the factors’ association with outcomes at trial and
on appeal. They hypothesized that different selection-related factors
tugged in different directions, with one factor, agency costs, conceivably
increasing, decreasing, or not affecting plaintiff win rates. They con-
cluded that the multimodal approach helped explain appellate outcomes,
although only high defendant stakes and high awards were statistically
significantly associated with appellate victories. High defendant stakes
were associated with defendant wins on appeal. High awards were as-
sociated with plaintiff wins on appeal.
Taken together, selection effect considerations and prior results sug-
gest that generating specific predictions from selection effect theory is
challenging. Nevertheless, the Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996) focus
on possible differences across case categories is plausible, and one can,
at a minimum, regard selection effect considerations as forecasting het-
erogeneous appellate reversal rates across case categories because of,
inter alia, varying plaintiff-defendant differences in stakes across case
categories.
3. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Two distinct, although related, data sets supply the data necessary for
this study. First, the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, a project of
the NCSC and the BJS, gathers data directly from state court clerks’
offices on tort, contract, and property cases disposed of by trial during
calendar year 2001. The 2001 data set covers state courts of general
jurisdiction in a random sample of 46 of the nation’s 75 most populous
counties. The 75 counties from which the sample of 46 was drawn
include approximately 37 percent of the 1990 U.S. population and about
one-half of all civil lawsuits filed in state courts. The 2001 data set
includes information on 8,038 trials (U.S. Department of Justice 2004,
pp. 4–5).
The second data set used in this study enhanced the first. The NCSC
and BJS implemented a follow-up study that supplemented the 2001
trial study by tracking the 1,204 cases in which the trial verdict or
judgment that concluded by trial during the calendar year 2001 was
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appealed to an intermediate appellate court or a state’s court of last
resort by April 2005 (U.S. Department of Justice 2005). Of this universe
of 1,204 appeals, 47 (3.9 percent) were excluded from many of our
analyses because the appeals lacked critical information about which
party prevailed at trial.
Because we are most interested in appeals from trial court decisions
clearly adverse to a party, we excluded cases in which it was not clear
that the nature of the appeal was adverse. For example, if the trial court
ruled for the plaintiff, most would expect that the defendant would be
the appellant in any appeal. Conversely, where the trial court ruled for
the defendant, one would expect the plaintiff to be the appellant. For
the most part (in 83.4 percent of the appeals), these expectations were
met. Discarding the small subgroup of nonadverse appeals generates a
universe of 965 usable appeals and permits a more precise picture of
appeals by plaintiffs and defendants from the trial court judgments en-
tered against them. The appeal rate, drawn from the pool of adverse
appeals, is the percentage of trial court judgments for one party or the
other that the losing party puts onto the appellate docket.4
After so filtering, computations of reversal and affirmance rates were
straightforward. The reversal rate is the percentage of appeals that gen-
erate a formal legal conclusion that either reversed5 or remanded the
trial court decision. The affirmance rate, by contrast, is the percentage
of cases that generated an appellate court decision affirming the trial
court.
Merging the two NCSC and BJS data sets generates a unique source
of data: a longitudinal view of the universe of state appellate activity
drawn from the most representative sample of state trial activity in the
United States. These data facilitate the systematic study of appeals of
trials. With direct access to the state court clerk’s offices, as well as
approximately 100 trained coders recording data, the data set avoids
traditional limitations incident to relying on litigants or third parties to
report. Self-reports, common in many commercial verdict reporters, typ-
ically overstate plaintiff win rates and damage award levels (Eisenberg
et al. 1997; Merritt and Barry 1999; Moller, Pace, and Carroll 1999).
Despite the state civil appeals data set’s unique strengths, it is not
without limitations. First, our data are limited to tried cases and there-
4. For a similar approach to defining the appeal rate, see Clermont and Eisenberg
(2001, p. 129).
5. By “reversed” we mean reversed in whole or in part.
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fore do not include cases appealed after dispositive pretrial motions.
Second, because our sample focuses on the nation’s largest counties and
state courts of general jurisdiction, the data might not convey those
aspects of the civil justice system, if any, that are peculiar to smaller
counties or rural areas or to cases heard in special-jurisdiction courts
(Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1997; Heise
2000). Third, the focus on state courts precludes generating implications
for federal courts.
Selection effects also influence our data set in various ways. As Table
1 illustrates, the stream of cases encounters an array of filters as it
proceeds from the civil dispute stage through the trial and appeals pro-
cesses. As only a small fraction of civil actions filed reach trial, the pool
of tried cases may systematically differ from the larger pool of civil
disputes from which they emerged. The appeals process itself imposes
additional filters. Only 12 percent of the tried civil cases initiated the
appeals process (although the percentage is slightly higher if one includes
the ambiguous, nonadverse appeals).6 Fewer cases still (6.8 percent) pur-
sued the appeals process to decision. That is, of the cases that began the
appeals process, just over one-half (56.9 percent) completed at least the
first level of it, disposition by an intermediate appellate court.
There are strong theoretical reasons to expect these selection effects
to result in a nonrandom sample of cases on appeal. Expectations theory
predicts that objectively strong or weak civil cases will settle or reach a
conclusion prior to reaching a conclusion at trial (Eisenberg 1989). Lit-
igants who take cases to trial do so partly because they can afford to
pursue trial litigation and, presumably, because they sense some reason-
able level of uncertainty—factual or legal—as to a case’s outcome (Priest
and Klein 1984). This subpool of cases that withstands settlement or
withdrawal, motions for directed verdicts and summary judgments, and
other dispositions more likely comprises cases whose underlying merits
reside somewhere in the gray middle area. A similar set of filters arise
anew during the posttrial appeals process (Priest and Klein 1984; Revesz
2000). These various selection filters influence the case stream over time
and in a manner that generates a skewed subset of appeals. The data
allow us to account for one aspect of the selection processes at work:
the decision to undertake an appeal after trial.
6. If one includes the nonadverse appeals, then the overall appeal rate is 14.4 percent.
We do not compute reversal rates using nonadverse appeals because of the ambiguity of
which party benefited.
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4. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
We now turn to those cases that initiated the appeals process, explore
appeal rates and appellate outcomes, and assess how they vary across
trial, party, and case types. The left-hand columns of Table 1 report the
basic pattern of state court appeals. For ease of comparison, the table’s
right-hand columns present the same information for appeals in federal
court. The federal data cover the period 1988–97.
4.1. The Vanishing Appeal?
If state civil complaints that result in a trial on the merits are becoming
increasingly rare over time (Galanter 2004), rarer still, as Table 1 illus-
trates, are the 12 percent of trial judgments that saw initiation of the
appeals process. Fewer trials still (6.8 percent) resulted in an appellate
court decision. Assessing whether the 12 percent appeal and the 6.8
percent appeal-to-completion rates are large or small, and how they
might trend over time, requires context. Regrettably, detailed time series
on state court appeals from trials data are not available.7 Our cross-
sectional data provide only a snapshot of the state civil appeals world
rather than a longitudinal picture of trends over sustained periods of
time. With directly relevant data lacking, we turn instead to other sources
for context.
Data on federal civil appeals provide one reference point for state
civil appeals data, albeit an imperfect one. Table 1 illustrates a discern-
able difference in federal and state appellate courts in terms of appeals
rates. At first glance, Clermont and Eisenberg’s (2002b) federal tried-
case appeals rate (28.7 percent) suggests that our state appeals rate (12
percent) may be small both in comparative and absolute terms. Structural
differences between the streams of federal and state appeals, however,
help explain the difference in federal and state appeals rates. Important
differences in the types of claims pursued in state and federal appellate
courts might account for appeals rate differences. For example, to access
the federal court system, litigants must either raise a federal question
(28 U.S.C. sec. 1331) or plead for damages that now exceed $75,000
and establish diversity between parties (28 U.S.C. sec. 1332[a]). Either
7. The best available data on trial court filings and appellate court dispositions are
from the National Center for State Courts annual caseload statistics, available online for
1998–2005 (see National Center for State Courts, CSP: Court Statistics Project [http://
www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/CSP_Main_Page.html]). But these data do not sepa-
rately report on appeals of tried cases.
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jurisdictional requirement might route systematically higher stakes cases
into federal courts and away from state courts. Just as higher stakes
cases tended to be litigated to trial more than their lower stakes coun-
terparts, higher stakes cases might similarly exert upward pressure on
decisions to appeal (Gross and Syverud 1991; Posner 1998). Therefore,
if federal trials typically involve higher stake claims than those pursued
in state trials, we should expect the federal appeals rate to exceed the
state appeals rate.8
A steady diminution of trial activity over time might also contribute
to the differences in federal and state appeals rates presented in Table
1. Galanter’s (2004) important study of trial activity and rates docu-
ments a profound and sustained reduction in civil trial activity in federal
and state courts. In light of a decline in trial activity as a percentage of
case filings, one might expect a similar decline in litigants’ appetite for
posttrial appeals. Insofar as the Clermont and Eisenberg (2001, 2002b)
studies of federal appeals involve an earlier time period (1988–97) than
our study of state appeals (2001–5 appeals of cases tried in 2001), our
finding of a lower state appeals rate might be due to the different time
periods of the two studies and capture a downturn in appeals activity.
This alternative explanation, however, assumes that federal and state
trial and appeals rates trend similarly in both magnitude and direction.
The influence of motor vehicle cases on state courts also contributes
to the difference between state and federal appeals rates. Motor vehicle
cases account for 35.1 percent of our pool of state trials and are by far
the most common case type. Such cases account for a much smaller
fraction of federal trials (Eisenberg et al. 1996). The appeal rate for
motor vehicle cases (4.0 percent), however, is the lowest across all in-
dividual case types. Consequently, the sheer number of motor vehicle
cases and their low appeal rate combine to depress the overall state
appeals rate. The overall state appeals rate increases from about 12 to
16.3 percent, somewhat closer to the federal appeals rate (28.7 percent),
if one disregards state motor vehicle cases. Even after such an adjust-
ment, however, a sizable gap between the state and federal appeals rates
persists.
Regardless of whether one regards the overall state civil appeals rate
(12 percent) as large or small, the overall rate masks important variation
8. Although the intuition that structural differences between federal and state courts
might route systematically higher stakes cases into federal courts strikes us as plausible, it
bears noting that the intuition lacks empirical verification. Our data do not permit reliable
assessments about the actual case in controversy.
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across party and trial types as well as case types. These observed vari-
ations largely track variations observed in the federal system. As Table
1 illustrates, defendants who lost at trial were more likely than plaintiffs
to initiate an appeal (12.7 versus 11.3 percent). Our findings comport
with party appeal rates in the federal context, although Clermont and
Eisenberg (2002b) report a slightly larger gap between defendant- and
plaintiff-initiated appeals (31.3 versus 26.8 percent). State litigants were
more likely to appeal bench than jury trial decisions (14.0 versus 11.4
percent). Clermont and Eisenberg (2002b) found a numerically small
gap in appeal rate between trial types (29.0 versus 28.5 percent); the
appeal rate gap between trial types in our study achieved statistical
significance (x2p 9.088, ). The highest appeals rate combinationp ! .003
belonged to defendants who lost at a bench trial. The combination as-
sociated with the lowest appeals rate involved plaintiffs who lost in front
of a jury.
In addition to party and trial type variation, as Table 2 shows, appeals
rates also varied, sometimes substantially, across case types. Although
12 percent of all state-tried cases were appealed, professional (nonmed-
ical) malpractice, employment contracts, and product liability cases were
appealed at rates far above the mean (30.9, 29.5, and 25.6 percent,
respectively). As previously discussed, motor vehicle cases were the least
likely case type to generate an appeal (4.0 percent). If differences in case
stakes help explain differences in the federal and state appeals rates,
similar differences might also explain variations in appeals rates across
state case types. For example, the appeals rate for professional mal-
practice claims may exceed that of motor vehicle claims because of dif-
ferences in the financial stakes contested in such cases.
4.2. Appeal Dropouts
If comparatively few litigants in state trials pursued an appeal, fewer
still pursued an appeal to a decision on the merits. Table 1 shows that
of the 965 cases that initiated the appeals process, 549 pursued an appeal
to completion.9 Appeals that dropped out prior to decision were resolved
through settlement, withdrawal, or other disposition. Federal litigants
displayed a similar, if slightly more severe, pattern. While just over 43
percent of all state appeals were resolved prior to completion, more than
one-half (57.6 percent) of the federal appeals settled prior to completion.
9. By “completion,” we mean an appeals court decision was entered affirming or
reversing or remanding to the trial court.
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Thus, once a notice of an appeal was filed, state litigants were more
likely than their federal counterparts to pursue an appeal to completion.
As Table 1 illustrates, although state appeals-to-completion rates var-
ied across party and trial types as well as case categories, they varied
less noticeably than appeals rates. Although defendants who lost at trial
were more likely than plaintiffs to initiate an appeal, they were slightly
less likely to pursue their appeals to a completion on the merits (6.6
versus 7.1 percent). Regarding trial types, bench trials were more likely
to be appealed and to be appealed to completion (7.6 versus 6.6 percent)
than jury trials. Both of these trends comport with Clermont and Ei-
senberg’s (2002b) study of federal appeals.
Table 2 reveals how state appeals-to-completion rates varied across
case types. With the overall 56.9 percent appeals-to-completion rate
serving as a reference point, product liability, other tort, and property
appeals were more likely pursued to completion by litigants. All had
completion rates of at least 69 percent. In contrast, motor vehicle and
seller plaintiff appeals were more likely to be resolved through settlement
or otherwise; both case types had appeal completion rates of less than
50 percent.
Focusing on those appeals pursued to completion does not account
for the sizable number of appeals initiated but resolved prior to appellate
court decision through settlement, withdrawal, or other pretrial dispo-
sition. What might explain the overall 43.1 percent appeals dropout
rate? Table 3 charts state civil appeals’ attrition from trial court decision
through a state’s initial appeals court and to a state’s highest appellate
court. Interestingly, only 24 (or .3 percent) cases from our sample per-
sisted through an accepted appeal by a state’s highest court.
Clearly, legal strategy plays an important role in explaining why lit-
igants initiate but do not complete appeals (LoPucki and Weyrauch
2000). By launching an appeal, a party can impose additional litigation
costs on an opponent, establish a risk of loss of a trial court victory,
delay final disposition of a case, and encumber a trial court award (Dal-
ton 1985). While trial courts’ decisions disposed of the overwhelming
majority (88 percent) of tried state civil claims, for some percentage of
litigants a trial court judgment is best understood as an opening bid to
influence the settlement process that persists even after a notice of appeal
has been filed.
Setting aside purely strategic appeals, some degree of settlement ac-
tivity results from the normal forces at work in litigation at the posttrial
stage (Hyman et al. 2007). Moreover, on some level, appeals settlement
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activity reflects an increase in formal institutional activity designed to
promote settlements during the appeals process. For example, state ap-
peals courts in Michigan operate a settlement program, which became
fully operational in February 1998 (McNally 2000). Whether appeals
settlement programs such as Michigan’s stimulate cases to settle that
otherwise would not is not clear. Nevertheless, such programs illustrate
institutional commitments to appellate settlement.
4.3. Appeal Outcomes
Theory and folklore influence important perceptions about the outcome
of appeals. Selection theory implies that, similar to trial outcomes, ap-
peals outcomes (reverse or affirm) should be roughly similar and dis-
tributed equally between plaintiffs and defendants (Priest and Klein
1984). Attorney folklore also emphasizes the insulation of jury verdicts
from reversal by appellate courts (see, for example, Somerville 1992).
Neither theory nor folklore, however, satisfactorily explains our major
findings. Appeals courts were far more likely to affirm than reverse a
trial court decision (67.9 versus 32.1 percent). Moreover, appeals courts
were more inclined to reverse jury than judge decisions. Finally, defen-
dants were more successful than plaintiffs in reversing an adverse trial
outcome.
As noted above, unrefined case-selection considerations suggest that
state trials and appeals should approximate 50 percent success for plain-
tiffs and defendants. At the state trial court level, selection theory rea-
sonably describes the outcome distribution—at least at the aggregate
level—as outcomes do not dramatically favor plaintiffs or defendants
(U.S. Department of Justice 2004). However, aggregate win rates in trial
courts mask substantial variation across case types. In 2001, for ex-
ample, plaintiffs’ trial win rates ranged from a high of 72.7 percent
(mortgage foreclosure cases) to a low of 26.8 percent (medical mal-
practice cases) (U.S. Department of Justice 2004).
Regardless of how well selection theory predicts state trial outcomes,
state appellate outcomes are not close to 50 percent wins for plaintiffs
and defendants. As Table 1 shows, we find an overall 32.1 percent re-
versal rate. This rate is closer to the 18.4 percent federal appeals reversal
rate that Clermont and Eisenberg (2002b) found than to the (approxi-
mately) 50 percent rate that basic selection theory predicts.10 Thus, the
10. The approximately 70 percent higher rate of reversal of state trials than federal
trials warrants future study. The higher state reversal rate is not a consequence of a different
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filtering mechanisms and case type mix that yielded an aggregate trial
success rate not too far from 50 percent applied differently to filtering
decisions to appeal. The predominance of affirmance over reversal is
comforting since high reversal rates imply high trial court error rates or
troublingly high rates of appellate court and trial court disagreement.
More dramatic is the starkly asymmetric distribution of appellate
outcomes between plaintiffs and defendants and jury and bench trials.
As Table 1 shows, defendants were far more likely than plaintiffs (41.5
versus 21.5 percent) to successfully reverse an adverse trial outcome.
Indeed, from the perspective of a plaintiff victorious at trial, the appeals
process offered a chance to retain victory not far from what a coin flip
would predict. For defendants, by contrast, victories at trial were far
more secure. Moreover, as Table 2 illustrates, the reversal rate difference
substantially favored defendants in both bench and jury trials and in all
but one case type. The exceptional case type, product liability, had only
21 completed appeals, and the difference in reversal rate did not ap-
proach statistical significance. As the final column in Table 2 illustrates,
the overall difference in defendant and plaintiff reversal rates (41.5 ver-
sus 21.5 percent) achieved statistical significance, along with a few in-
dividual case types.11
Table 2 also conveys the level of variation across case types in terms
of the defendant advantage at the appellate level. In five of the 14 case
types considered, the defendants’ reversal rate met or exceeded 50 per-
cent. In none of the case types considered did the plaintiffs’ reversal rate
exceed 40 percent. Thus, defendants emerged from the state appellate
process in a far better position than they left the trial court.
Finally, although bench trials were more likely than jury trials to
involve an appeal (14 versus 11.4 percent), Table 1 shows that, contrary
to conventional wisdom, appellate courts were kinder to judge than to
jury decisions (27.5 versus 33.7 percent reversal rate). Moreover, the
reversal rates favored defendants across trial types. As Table 2 illustrates,
these asymmetrical differences achieved statistical significance.
On balance our findings so far are consistent with prior research on
federal courts (Clermont and Eisenberg 2001, 2002b), and they suggest
an appeals court tilt favoring defendants, especially defendants who lost
mix of case types because only one category of federal cases, fraud, achieves the overall
state reversal rate of about 32 percent. No other federal case category has a reversal rate
as high as 30 percent (see Clermont and Eisenberg 2002b, pp. 954–55, table 2).
11. The case types that achieved statistical significance include assault, slander and
libel, professional (nonmedical) malpractice, and seller plaintiff cases.
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in a jury trial. Because the evidence is descriptive, however, it can easily
mask confounding factors, including the trial court’s behavior, the de-
cision to appeal, and posttrial settlement conduct. To explore whether
our results are an artifact of factors not considered, we proceed to more
formally model both the decision to appeal and the appellate case out-
come.
5. EVALUATING COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR A DEFENDANT ADVANTAGE BY
MODELING APPEALS
As Section 2 suggests, theory supplies two plausible explanations for
our asymmetrical appellate outcomes. More formal models—and em-
pirical testing of those models—should inform assessments about each
explanation’s explanatory power. Given the observational nature of our
data, we cannot conclusively establish causal inference relating to the
asymmetric reversal rate. Nevertheless, the asymmetrical distribution of
appeals outcomes warrants a more statistically sophisticated explanatory
effort. The complete trial outcome data available allow us the unusual
opportunity to account for the flow of cases to appellate courts as well
as the appellate outcomes.
Efforts to model appellate outcomes must account, first, for the se-
lection bias generated by the necessary decision to appeal a trial court
verdict and, second, for the outcome of the appeal itself. If appellate
courts see plaintiff and defendant posttrial appeals that differ in quality,
the decision to appeal may be generating the unbalanced appellate out-
comes. To account for a selection effect generated by the predicate de-
cision to pursue (and complete) an appeal and, in turn, how it might
influence the outcome of an appealed case, we used a Heckman probit
selection model. This model did not suggest that the selection of cases
to appeal was driving the appellate outcome pattern, so we also report
simple models of appellate outcomes limited to cases that were appealed.
5.1. Testing Hypotheses by Modeling the Decision to Appeal and the
Appeal Outcome
What variables should appellate models include? With respect to the
decision to appeal, parties’ perceptions (correct or not) about how ap-
pellate courts react to jury trials compared with bench trials, and to
plaintiff trial court wins compared with defendant wins, likely inform
litigants. To capture this possibility, we include dummy variables sig-
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naling whether a case was tried to a jury or judge and whether a plaintiff
or defendant prevailed.
We also expect that a state and particular case type’s reversal culture
influences a decision to pursue an appeal. For each state12 and case
category, we computed an overall reversal rate. For example, the reversal
rates in Georgia and New Jersey were 12.5 and 56.3 percent, respectively.
Similarly, reversal rates for various case types ranged from 50 percent
(employment contract cases) to 23.1 percent (lease cases). Holding all
else constant, we expect that parties seeking to reverse a trial court
decision would be more reluctant to pursue an appeal in states with
lower reversal rates or involving case types with lower reversal rates.
In addition to varied reversal rates, case types also exercise important
influence over other factors. For example, case types influence the routing
of cases to either judges or juries and display sometimes sharply different
trial outcomes (Clermont and Eisenberg 1992). Case types also influence
various trial facets, such as case disposition time (Heise 2000). Given
case types’ wide-ranging influences on the civil justice system, we also
anticipate that case types influence the appeals process. We therefore
include a dummy variable for each of our 14 case types other than a
reference category.
Individuals, corporations, and governments vary in their appetite for
and behavior in litigation (Eisenberg and Farber 2003), and it is rea-
sonable to assume that such variation persists into the appeals process.
To account for this variation, we use dummy variables to identify cases
involving corporate plaintiffs, corporate defendants, and government
plaintiffs.13 The litigant characteristics are salient regardless of the trial
outcome. For example, to the extent that individual litigants believe that
corporations behave differently in the litigation context, such differences
would presumably present regardless of whether the corporation won
or lost at trial. Moreover, because litigants’ decisions about whether to
appeal may vary over time, we include the year the lawsuit was initially
filed to help control for any linear time trend in our data. Finally, to
account for state-level effects, we include state dummy variables for those
states with more than one sampled county.
Efforts to model the outcome of an appeal call for a similar, although
12. The “other states” dummy variable includes six states (Georgia, Hawaii, Massa-
chusetts, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin) in which no more than one appeal was
reversed during the time frame of our study.
13. We focus on these particular pairings in an effort to tether this study to prior
studies. In any event, the inclusion of other pairings does not disturb our core findings.
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slightly different, set of independent variables. Analyzing the determi-
nants of appellate court outcomes (reversals) is our principal interest,
and, among the array of plausible independent variables, our primary
focus involves trial type (bench versus jury) and trial outcome (defendant
or plaintiff victory). Our descriptive results, presented in Tables 1 and
2, suggest that appellate reversals were more likely for defendants who
lost in jury trials. Other independent variables, such as case types, party
types, and the year the appeal was filed, are obvious candidates for
inclusion given the import of these variables for the decision to file an
appeal as well as for the trial court outcome. To account for possible
state-level effects on the appellate outcome, we include dummy variables
for each state and a dummy variable signaling those states that have
more than one sampled large county. Finally, because outcomes of in-
dividual appeals within a county might not be independent of one an-
other, we treat appeals as clustered at the county level, resulting in ad-
justed standard errors.
5.2. Results
Table 4 reports results of the key variables in the appeals outcome por-
tion of our selection model 1. The selection model includes all tried
cases. Our findings show that, similar to our descriptive findings, plain-
tiffs who won jury trials were more likely to be reversed on appeal
(coefficient p .532, ). Focusing only on jury trials, a test of thep ! .001
difference between the dummy variables “defendant won jury trial” and
“plaintiff won jury trial” achieved statistical significance (x2 p 15.30,
), which further suggests important differences between howp ! .001
appeals courts treat defendant and plaintiff trial court victories. Since
the selection parameter, r, did not achieve statistical significance, we also
report a logit model limited to appellate outcomes in those cases ap-
pealed to conclusion.14 In the logit model, after accounting for case type
and other variables, the average predicted probability of reversing a
plaintiff trial win was .42, and the average predicted probability of
reversing a defendant trial win was .23.
For jury trials, the finding of higher reversal rates of plaintiff trial
14. The logit model yielded a slightly more accurate classification of appellate outcomes
than did a similar probit model. We also explored a two-level multilevel model using a
random intercept for county-level effects and a three-level multilevel model using random
intercepts at the county and state levels. In both models the plaintiff-defendant reversal
rate differences were highly statistically significant (see Gelman and Hill [2007] for a
discussion).
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Table 4. Models of State Appellate Outcome and the Decision to Appeal
Model 1 Model 2
Appeal outcome:
Trial outcomes:
Defendant won bench trial Reference Reference
Plaintiff won bench trial .174 (.184) .914* (.465)
Defendant won jury trial .099 (.164) .123 (.328)
Plaintiff won jury trial .532** (.164) 1.189** (.358)
States:
Arizona Reference Reference
California .065 (.472) 1.807 (1.254)
Connecticut .032 (.507) .929 (1.287)
Florida .237 (.476) 1.058 (1.235)
Illinois .480 (.521) 1.084 (1.327)
Indiana .323* (.149) .489* (.233)
Kentucky .214 (.143) .832** (.230)
Michigan .109 (.173) .110 (.268)
Minnesota .712** (.161) .662** (.223)
Missouri .005 (.153) .328 (.238)
New Jersey .623 (.497) .473 (1.314)
New York .069 (.157) .575** (.208)
Ohio .053 (.503) 2.071 (1.307)
Pennsylvania .370 (.464) 1.284 (1.248)
Texas .251 (.493) 1.083 (1.288)
Washington .117 (.158) .283 (.226)
Other states .682** (.182) 1.270** (.435)
Multicounty state .261 (.445) 1.305 (1.224)
Case types:
Motor vehicle Reference Reference
Dangerous premises .375 (.206) .082 (.535)
Product liability .790* (.318) .371 (.598)
Assault, slander, and libel .829** (.250) 1.066 (.587)
Medical malpractice .412 (.246) .111 (.529)
Professional malpractice 1.052* (.438) .976 (.755)
Other tort .529 (.301) .170 (.570)
Fraud .536 (.373) .200 (.750)
Seller plaintiff .414 (.303) .161 (.575)
Buyer plaintiff .486 (.293) .149 (.538)
Employment contract 1.180** (.282) 1.281* (.520)
Lease .344 (.433) .022 (.856)
Other contract .712* (.329) .799 (.635)
Property 1.028** (.276) .405 (.556)
Year case filed .059 (.042) .045 (.070)
Litigant characteristics:
Government plaintiff .285 (.324) .201 (.676)
Corporate plaintiff .150 (.092) .302 (.188)
Corporate defendant .009 (.113) .110 (.221)
Constant 115.537 (84.123) 88.233 (140.531)
N . . . 545
Log likelihood . . . 308.071
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of
fit . . . 9.71 (p 1 .29)
Pseudo R2 . . . .100
Appeals classified correctly (%) . . . 71.4
Reduction in classification error
from naive model . . . 10.9
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Table 4. continued
Model 1 Model 2
Decision to appeal (N p 7,998):
Trial outcomes:
Defendant won bench trial Reference Reference
Plaintiff won bench trial .242** (.079) .433** (.143)
Defendant won jury trial .104 (.089) .219 (.159)
Plaintiff won jury trial .115 (.090) .221 (.162)
State reversal rate .008* (.003) .017* (.007)
Case type reversal rate .048** (.006) .091** (.010)
Multicounty state .075 (.095) .160 (.182)
Case types:
Motor vehicle Reference Reference
Dangerous premises .322** (.085) .711** (.172)
Product liability .579** (.149) 1.145** (.254)
Assault, slander, and libel .171 (.137) .250 (.240)
Medical malpractice .667** (.077) 1.350** (.153)
Professional malpractice .369* (.156) .686** (.262)
Other tort .846** (.080)
Fraud .513** (.083) 1.037** (.151)
Seller plaintiff .414** (.085) .849** (.158)
Buyer plaintiff .512** (.093) 1.053** (.178)
Employment contract . . . . . .
Lease .834** (.195) 1.652** (.371)
Other contract .032 (.117) .117 (.212)
Property .891** (.187) 1.735** (.338)
Year case filed .050** (.017) .093** (.031)
Litigant characteristics:
Government plaintiff .246 (.217) .437 (.381)
Corporate plaintiff .126 (.085) .236 (.154)
Corporate defendant .136** (.050) .238* (.094)
Constant 97.161** (33.599)
Rho .429 (.283) . . .
N (outcomes) 961 . . .
Log likelihood 3,105.72 2,683.04
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of
fit . . . 10.78 (p 1 .21)
Pseudo R2 . . . .087
Source. U.S. Department of Justice (2006).
Note. Model 1 includes Heckman appeal outcome and decision-to-appeal equations; the
dependent variable is reversal of the trial court decision. Model 2 includes separate logit
appeal outcome and decision-to-appeal models; the dependent variable in the appeal out-
come model is reversal of the trial court decision, and the dependent variable in the decision-
to-appeal model is whether an appeal was filed. “Other states” consists of the six states
(Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin) that had no
more than one appeal reversal. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. We estimated
the models using the “heckprob” and “logit” commands in Stata (v.9.2). The naive model
predicts affirmance in 100% of appeals.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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victories is highly statistically significant in both models. For bench trials,
the positive coefficients for “plaintiff won bench trial” suggest a similar
pro-defendant direction, but the significance of this result is sensitive to
model specification. So the defendant advantage persists in the models,
but most strongly in jury trials. The models confirm that jury trials are
more prone to reversal than are bench trials. The “plaintiff won jury
trial” coefficient is larger than the “plaintiff won bench trial” coefficient
in both models. And the “defendant won jury trial” coefficient is con-
sistently positive relative to the reference category of “defendant won
bench trial.” But these results are not statistically significant. Overall,
the regression model results are consistent with the results of Table 1
showing a large difference between plaintiff and defendant reversal rates
and a more modest difference between bench trial and jury trial reversal
rates.
5.3. Discussion
With respect to the attitudinal explanation, results from the regression
models support the earlier descriptive findings and are consistent with
an appellate court tilt favoring defendants, especially defendants who
lost a jury trial. With respect to selection effects, we do not doubt that
they are at work. But the consistent pattern of our results across case
categories suggests that selection effects are unlikely to completely ex-
plain the appellate outcome pattern. In addition, a slight negative in-
ference emerges from the selection model, yielding results similar to the
nonselection logit model. This weakens (albeit indirectly) the selection
hypothesis’s implications for the limits of modeling appellate outcomes
based on the sample of appealed cases. Taken together, our findings
provide more support for the attitudinal hypothesis than the selection
effect hypothesis.
5.4. Implications for the Attitudinal Hypothesis
In both models, a plaintiff jury trial victory is associated with an appeals
court reversal at a statistically significant level. This finding comports
with what the descriptive analyses implied, as well as with prior research
on federal appeals, although with less breadth. Clermont and Eisenberg
(2001, 2002b) found a federal court appeals outcome tilt favoring de-
fendants who lost either bench or jury trials. Our findings are consistent
with the federal findings, although the state court bench trial effects are
less significant than the federal.
Do these findings imply that juries exert a level of pro-plaintiff bias
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that accounts for the overall perceived pro-plaintiff bias at the trial court
level? This scenario is unlikely, especially insofar as trial court judges
retain the legal authority to override jury decisions in civil cases. As well,
a considerable and growing empirical literature suggests that, in general,
judges and juries act in comparable ways when confronted with com-
parable cases (Kalven and Zeisel 1966; Eisenberg et al. 2005, 2006). If
they do, we are left to explain why the appellate process treats judge
and jury decisions, in general, and plaintiff and defendant jury trial
outcomes, in particular, differently.
Whether the observed higher plaintiff reversal rate flows from trial
courts favoring plaintiffs, appeals courts favoring defendants, or some
combination of both remains unclear. Findings from other research that
focuses on just this question (whether the trial courts exhibit bias or
whether appeals courts assume trial court bias), however, provide little
support for the actual trial court bias explanation (Lempert 1998; Saks
1998; Vidmar 1998). Because appeals courts’ systematic disagreement
with trial courts is strongest for jury verdicts favoring plaintiffs combined
with aggregate trial court decisions that have not been demonstrated to
favor plaintiffs over defendants, the interpretation that appellate court
misperceptions about jurors’ bias toward plaintiffs—rather than outright
jury bias at trial—is currently the more plausible explanation. To be
clear, we do not propose a conspiracy theory of concerted action by
appellate judges. Instead, we only invoke the notion that appellate judges
entertain some of the same misperceptions about trial court outcomes
as the general populace and that these misperceptions influence appellate
outcomes.
5.5. Implications for Selection Hypothesis
The combination of our positive and negative findings points us away
from the selection hypothesis as a complete explanation for appellate
outcomes.
5.5.1. Little Evidence of a Selection Effect Explanation. If selection effects
alone were driving the appellate outcome pattern, one might expect more
heterogeneity in that pattern. Selection-based models, such as those ex-
plored by Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996), employ case-category-level
differences, such as varying stakes, to help account for selection effects.
But, as noted above, Table 2 shows a strikingly consistent antiplaintiff
pattern across many case categories.
Selection theory also predicts that the side with comparatively more at
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stake should be willing to settle its weakest cases and, in so doing, increase
its win rate for those cases fully adjudicated (Clermont and Eisenberg 2001).
The plaintiff win rate at trial was approximately 55.4 percent (U.S. De-
partment of Justice 2004), and it remains possible that the slightly higher
plaintiff trial win rate might evidence plaintiffs’ higher stakes (Clermont
and Eisenberg 2001). Just as plaintiffs’ higher stakes in cases should boost
their trial win rates, the selection hypothesis also predicts that the side with
lower stakes (defendants) would appeal more often. However, although
defendants did, in fact, appeal slightly more often than plaintiffs (12.7 versus
11.3 percent), this difference achieved only marginal statistical significance
(x2p 3.718, ). Moreover, although defendants appealed more oftenp ! .054
than plaintiffs, defendants appealed to conclusion slightly less often than
did plaintiffs (6.6 versus 7.1 percent), which is again a difference that is not
significant (x2 p .575, ).p ! .448
More important, however, is that plaintiffs, whose hypothesized higher
case stakes should make them more selective about what cases to push
to trial, should be equally careful about pushing only strong cases on
appeal.15 If so, appeal reversal rates for plaintiffs would approximate the
defendants’ reversal rate, if not exceed it. As Table 2 shows, however, this
was not the case, as defendants enjoyed a far higher appeals reversal rate
than plaintiffs (41.5 versus 21.5 percent), and the difference in defendants’
and plaintiffs’ reversal rates was highly significant (x2 p 25.095, p !
)..001
In addition, results from our selection (Heckman) model 1 do not
support a selection explanation. Rho, a measure of the correlation in the
error term in the separate selection and outcome equations, is statistically
insignificant. Consequently, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the error
terms from the selection and outcome equations are uncorrelated. The
model provides no evidence that asymmetric reversal rates were a con-
sequence of the selection of cases for appeal.16 One should be careful not
to overly rely on this negative finding for two reasons. First, multiequation
selection models are highly sensitive to specification error. Small changes
in the selection model can substantially change outcome estimates (Briggs
2004). Second, we likely do not have the optimal set of variables to control
for both selection and the second-stage outcome.
15. Although the economics of appeals differ substantially from the economics of trials,
appeals are not costless.
16. Although the r test statistic in Heckman selection models is sensitive to model
specifications, our finding is robust across various alternative specifications of our core
Heckman selection model specification.
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Nevertheless, because r is not statistically significant and the sample
size is reasonably large, the logit model may suffice. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow test of that model’s fit, reported in Table 4, suggests that one
cannot reject the hypothesis that the model fits the data well. That model’s
statistically significant influence of plaintiff wins in jury trials on the out-
come of appeals provides additional evidence of the robustness of this
central finding.
We also are mindful that our findings only indirectly challenge the
selection effect hypothesis. Indeed, plausible counterarguments—espe-
cially those that our data and research design do not squarely address—
warrant careful consideration. For example, selection theory proponents
may suggest that plaintiffs start with systematically weaker cases and then
litigate them less effectively than do defendants.17 We are unaware of
empirical support for such claims, however. Moreover, such claims are
not theoretically persuasive. After all, at a general level, plaintiffs and
defendants face similar (albeit not identical) economic incentives. These
incentives should discipline plaintiffs and their attorneys and discourage
weak cases. To the extent that the litigation process itself discourages case
filings (Trubek et al. 1983), the pool of claims that begins the litigation
process might be systematically stronger than the universe of potential
legal claims. As well, our study involves appealed cases. By definition these
cases have persisted through the entire trial process, including the pretrial
motion stage, which, by design, also helps screen out extreme cases fa-
voring either party. Despite our pool of appealed cases having survived
multiple layers of filtering, we still found evidence of a pro-defendant
appellate court tilt. This finding conflicts with the “plaintiff weak case”
counterargument (Clermont and Schwab 2002).
5.5.2. Evidence of an Unexpected Selection Effect. Although we interpret
our findings to more strongly support an attitudinal rather than a se-
lection explanation for the asymmetrical distribution of state appellate
court reversals, one should not disregard the selection theory altogether.
In general, a more complete model of the litigation process would be
desirable. The decision to file a lawsuit and the decision to pursue a case
17. One limitation on interpreting both federal and state court plaintiff-defendant
asymmetric success on appeal is that the reversal rate is in part a function of what one
believes the objectively correct trial win rate should be. If the objectively correct trial win
rate in a case category differs from 50 percent, then one expects asymmetric plaintiff and
defendant reversal rates on appeal (see Eisenberg [2004] and Spencer [2007] for a
discussion).
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to trial likely influence the reversal pattern ultimately observed on ap-
peal. Since our data begin with tried cases, such a study is beyond the
scope of this paper.
And while selection theory may not explain asymmetric appellate
outcomes within the state context or, according to Clermont and Eisen-
berg (2001), within the federal context, selection theory may help explain
differences between the state and federal appellate settings.
At least two federal-state differences warrant note as they implicate
selection theory.18 First, the federal and state appeals settings generated
different appeal and reversal rates. Second, results from our more formal
models were slightly narrower than the corresponding results from a
federal appeals study. Specifically, where Clermont and Eisenberg (2001)
find that appellate reversals are significantly associated with plaintiff
bench and jury trial victories, we find a consistently significant associ-
ation only with plaintiff jury trial victories.
As noted above, structural differences between federal and state cases
likely contribute to the slightly different findings. We believe that selec-
tion effects generate distinctive streams of federal and state cases and
that these distinctive streams of cases react differently in the appeals
context. Within the federal and state appeals settings, strong evidence
of a selection effect does not emerge. Slight differences between the
federal and state appeals studies, however, hint at a possible selection
effect. Thus, it is not the case that selection considerations find no sup-
port in our study. Rather, we believe selection effects might present in
unexpected ways.19 With the benefit of empirical studies of the federal
and state appeals settings, we are now in a better position to speculate
whether and, if so, why this might be so. At this point, however, further
empirical work is necessary to rigorously explore this possibility.
5.6. Other Results
Although our discussion emphasizes our independent variables of inter-
est—trial outcomes—and their implications for the two hypotheses for
the asymmetric appellate outcomes, a few other results warrant brief
discussion. Among the litigant characteristics tested, although none
achieved statistical significance, as it relates to the appeal outcome, the
presence of a corporate defendant increased the probability that an ap-
18. Despite small differences in findings from the two studies, however, it remains
important to keep in mind that any differences are overwhelmed by the similarities.
19. Indeed, Clermont and Eisenberg (2001, p. 153) found evidence in their study of
federal appeals consistent with the selection theory.
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peal would be filed. This finding could suggest that corporate defendants
with deep pockets were more able to participate in the appeals process
or, in the alternative, to better manage the appeals process by virtue of
their greater litigation experience. Any such suggestions, however plau-
sible, extend beyond our data, as they relate to access to wealth and to
litigation experience. Moreover, the absence of a statistically significant
finding for the presence of a corporate plaintiff generates something of
a dilemma, unless one is prepared to argue that corporate plaintiffs and
defendants systematically differ in manners that implicate access to
wealth and litigation experience.
Our decision-to-appeal model also includes variables designed to ac-
count for reversal culture for individual case types and states on the
theory that a more favorable (higher) reversal rate should attract greater
appellate activity. Although the sign and magnitude of the case type
reversal rate control variable behaved as expected, the state reversal rate
control variable behaved unexpectedly.20 Two factors might contribute
to the state reversal rate’s negative coefficient. First, some amount of
measurement error owing to time lags may contribute to imprecision
with our reversal rate variables. The critical moment in time for purposes
of the hypothesized influence of reversal rates was when a litigant filed
a motion for appeal. The reversal rate variables used in our model derive
from actual appellate reversal counts from trials concluded in 2001. The
average disposition for an appeal that persisted to an appellate court
decision exceeded 463 days. Not only is it possible that state reversal
rates may have varied over time in this study (2001–5), but they may
also have varied between an appeal’s filing and an appellate court ruling.
Either possibility, if realized, would increase measurement error. Second,
we also note that Table A1 illustrates that the case type reversal rate
control variable is more uniformly distributed than the state counterpart.
The unexpected direction of the state reversal culture might be partly
due to its comparative greater variation.
6. CONCLUSION
This study provides the first systematic analysis of appeals from state
court trials and the degree to which state appellate court decisions and
opinions reflect trial-level activity. Less than 7 percent of tried cases are
20. Despite the unexpected sign for the state reversal rate variable, excluding it in
alternative model specifications did not disrupt our core findings.
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appealed to conclusion at any appellate level. This is lower than the
approximately 12 percent rate for federal litigation found in prior studies
covering a different time period. Appeal and reversal rates differ sub-
stantially across case types and reach or exceed 50 percent of defendant
appeals in five case categories, including employment litigation. Only .3
percent of tried cases are accepted for review by states’ highest courts.
While state court reversal rates are noticeably higher than federal
court reversal rates, state appellate courts, like federal courts, have a
greater propensity to overturn jury rather than bench trial verdicts and
plaintiff trial victories more than defendant trial victories. With respect
to these asymmetric reversal rates, our findings favor an attitudinal
rather than a pure selection explanation. That is, similar to the federal
setting, state appellate reversals that tilt favorably to defendants who
lost in a jury trial likely evidence appellate and trial courts’ differing
perceptions regarding the accuracy of jury trial outcomes.
Although our empirical findings suggest an asymmetric distribution
of appellate outcomes, we remain mindful that plausible alternative in-
terpretations exist, partly owing to incomplete data. Indeed, selection
effects likely influence the appellate setting but in unanticipated ways
that can be detected in part by comparing appellate outcomes between
state and federal systems. For example, although the attitudinal hy-
pothesis strikes us as more persuasive in explaining the distribution of
reversals within the state and federal systems, selection effects provide
a plausible possible explanation for differences in results between the
state and federal systems. In addition, it is logically possible that our
asymmetrical findings result from a trial court tilt favoring plaintiffs
rather than misperceptions at the appeals court level. Moreover, it might
be that jury trials are simply more prone to reversible error than bench
trials. If so, however, we are left with having to explain why plaintiff
jury trial victories (rather than plaintiff and defendant jury trial victories)
are significantly more prone to reversal. Finally, our data do not permit
reliable testing of the possible lure of precedent setting (Priest and Klein
1984, p. 52) and Galanter’s (1974) repeat-player theory, both of which
raise the specter of selection effects. Further empirical work, however,
is necessary to rigorously test these explanations.
The existence of plausible (although, as of yet, empirically untested)
alternative interpretations of our findings, however, does not detract
from the practical implications that flow from our findings, not least of
which is that the common wisdom regarding the sacrosanctity of trial
jury verdicts, especially those favoring plaintiffs, may be misplaced. Find-
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ings from our study of state civil appeals should inform scholars as well
as litigants and appellate judges.
APPENDIX A
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Reversed trial court .182 .386 0 1
Defendant won bench
trial .083 .275 0 1
Plaintiff won bench trial .150 .357 0 1
Defendant won jury trial .375 .484 0 1
Plaintiff won jury trial .392 .488 0 1
Arizona .050 .218 0 1
California .157 .364 0 1
Connecticut .020 .141 0 1
Florida .072 .258 0 1
Georgia .016 .124 0 1
Hawaii .003 .055 0 1
Illinois .053 .225 0 1
Indiana .015 .123 0 1
Kentucky .019 .137 0 1
Massachusetts .030 .170 0 1
Michigan .048 .214 0 1
Minnesota .025 .156 0 1
Missouri .018 .134 0 1
North Carolina .013 .113 0 1
New Jersey .077 .266 0 1
New York .038 .192 0 1
Ohio .050 .219 0 1
Pennsylvania .097 .295 0 1
Texas .126 .332 0 1
Virginia .031 .172 0 1
Washington .026 .159 0 1
Wisconsin .016 .124 0 1
Motor vehicle .351 .477 0 1
Assault, slander, and libel .039 .193 0 1
Product liability .015 .120 0 1
Dangerous premises .115 .319 0 1
Medical malpractice .106 .308 0 1
Professional malpractice .008 .092 0 1
Other tort .045 .207 0 1
Employment contract .035 .184 0 1
Fraud .053 .225 0 1
Lease .023 .151 0 1
Seller plaintiff .096 .295 0 1
Buyer plaintiff .066 .248 0 1
Other contract .026 .160 0 1
Property .022 .146 0 1
Year case filed 1998.91 1.341 1985 2001
Government plaintiff .008 .091 0 1
Corporate plaintiff .156 .363 0 1
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Table A1. continued
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Corporate defendant .425 .494 0 1
State appeals review rate 37.084 15.248 0 100
Case type appeals review
rate 29.589 6.069 23.077 50
Multicounty state .682 .466 0 1
Source. U.S. Department of Justice (2006).
Note. for all variables, except for reversed trial court, for whichNp 8,038
.Np 965
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